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In this paper I evaluate the eﬀect of student aid on the success of academic
studies. I focus on two dimensions, the duration of study and the probability of
actually graduating with a degree. While there is an extensive literature on the
impact of student aid on its intended outcome, the uptake of tertiary education,
the impact on the outcome and on study incentives has been mainly ignored. But
introducing student aid changes the students’ budget constraint. The increase in
the budget-set might lead to shorter time-to-degree if paid work is substituted by
study time. I analyze the eﬀect of ﬁnancial student aid granted by the German
Federal Education and Training Assistance Act (BAfoeG). To determine its impact,
I estimate a discrete-time duration model allowing for competing risks to account for
diﬀerent exit states (graduation and dropout) using individual level panel data from
the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) for the years 1984-2007. My ﬁndings
suggest that the duration of study is responsive to the type of ﬁnancial support
a student receives. There are three main results. First, student aid recipients
ﬁnish faster than comparable students who are supported by the same amount
of parental/private transfers only. Second, although higher ﬁnancial aid does on
average not aﬀect the duration of study, this eﬀect is (third) dominated by the
increased probability of actually ﬁnishing university successfully.
Keywords: academic outcomes, student aid, duration of study, BAfoeG, German
Socio-Economic Panel
JEL: I20, I22.
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Enrollment in tertiary education is an important and widely discussed topic in the aca-
demic literature1. But focusing only on the intake of new students disregards the actual
success of university studies. A successful course of study can be measured in terms of
actual graduation, the ﬁnal mark of the degree or in some cases, the time until the degree
is obtained. In this study I evaluate the eﬀect of student aid on the success of tertiary
education in terms of time-to-degree and actual graduation rates. While the change in
enrollment has been widely studied2, the question of the impact of student aid on the
success of academic studies remains an open one.
Therefore I will focus in this paper on the eﬀect of student aid on the outcome of
university studies. I jointly analyze the impact of student aid, ﬁrst on the probability to
graduate, and second on the duration of study. A student has the choice to spend his
time either on working to raise money for his education, on studying more intensively to
reduce the time until graduation and therefore improving the return to his education or
thirdly on leisure. When deciding how to allocate his time, a student ﬁrst has to consider
how to cover his subsistence level expenditures (i.e. cost of living, tuition fees, insurance,
etc.). Wealthy students can cover these costs by drawing money from their own or their
parents wealth. Students from poor families do not have this opportunity. In a situation
where borrowing constraints and no eﬃcient student aid system exist, these students
can only cover their costs by working, which results in less time available for studying.
This will prolong their time in tertiary education or may even force these students to
drop out of university, see e.g. Ehrenberg and Sherman (1987) or Stinebrickner and
Stinebrickner (2009). On the other hand, a too generous student aid program may set
wrong incentives. Students may remain in education longer than they would without the
funding. This would create unnecessary public costs not only for the compensation of
student aid, but also in terms of resources allocated to these students. Garibaldi et al.
1see e.g.Cameron and Taber (2004), Shea (2000), Carneiro and Heckman (2002) or Keane and Wolpin
(2001)
2see e.g. Dynarski (2003) or Kane (2003) for a literature overview for the US and Baumgartner and
Steiner (2006), Lauer (2000) or Steiner and Wrohlich (2008) for Germany
1(2007) report evidence on the eﬀect of ﬁnancial constraints on study behavior. They ﬁnd
that Italian university graduates study more eﬃciently if tuition costs are raised at the
end of their course of study. This causes the late completion rates to decrease and leaves
ﬁnal grades unchanged. Using German data from the University Konstanz, Heineck et al.
(2006) analyze the eﬀect of tuition on long term studies. They ﬁnd that for a few subjects,
e.g. Biology or Psychology, the time until graduation decreases with the introduction of
tuition fees, but at the same time the probability to drop out increases for all majors.
Previous research on the eﬀect of student aid on the time-to-degree, has primarily
focused on Ph.D.-students. Using data on all graduate students who entered the Ph.D.
program at Cornell University, Ehrenberg and Mavros (1995) ﬁnd that completion rates
and mean durations of the time doctoral students spend until completing their degree are
sensitive to the type of ﬁnancial support the students receive. Students with fellowships
and research assistantships have higher completion rates and a shorter time-to-degree
than the students with teaching assistantships, tuition waivers, or students who support
themselves. These ﬁndings are supported by Siegfried and Stock (2001, 2006) who use
data on Ph.D. graduates in economics in the US. They also ﬁnd that students who receive
fellowships that require no work graduate faster. In contrast, Booth and Satchell (1995)
ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀects of student aid on the graduation time using British data. The
focus on Ph.D.-students can be explained by the small variation of time-to-degree for
undergraduate students in many countries. These small variations are mainly due to
the university programs which expect the student to ﬁnish in a certain time frame. If
a student does not ﬁnish within this time frame, he mostly drops out of the program.
Ph.D.-students, in contrast, can arrange their time-to-degree more ﬂexibly according to
their own preferences.
A study which focuses on undergraduate students is conducted by H¨ akkinen and Uusi-
talo (2003) who evaluate a student aid reform in Finland. They ﬁnd that a more generous
supply of student grants results in a shorter duration of study. Since the eﬀect was con-
centrated in ﬁelds with long average time until graduation, the authors suggest that this
2eﬀect seems to be due to limits in the aid duration.
In the following I will evaluate the eﬀect of student aid on the outcome of study for
Germany. Germany is a particularly suitable example because, ﬁrst, the German Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP) provides a rich database of individual level data since 1984. It
is possible to track students from the beginning of their tertiary education through the
following years. Second, only recently the more time constrained Bachelor and Master
programs have been introduced to German universities. The usual degree before this,
i.e. in the “pre-Bologna”3 period, was a diploma, which was awarded upon reaching a
certain amount of credit points. Students were able to decide on their own, how many
credit points they wanted to acquire during each term4. This has the advantage that the
time-to-degree for undergraduate students was very heterogeneous. These circumstances
allow me to model the eﬀect of time-to-degree for undergraduate students, rather than
on the smaller and more selective sample of Ph.D.-students.
The main source of student aid in Germany are transfers based on the Federal Edu-
cation and Training Assistance Act (BAfoeG). This act was introduced in 1971 to allow
children from low income families to pursue higher education according to their abilities.
A need based amount of student aid should ensure the coverage of their living-expenses
during their time of study.
To determine the eﬀect of student aid on the outcome of study I use the SOEP
from the pre-Bologna period and apply a discrete duration model framework allowing
for competing risks and unobserved heterogeneity. Explicitly allowing for competing risks
has the advantage that the direct eﬀect of student aid on the duration of study can be
disentangled from the indirect sample selection eﬀect through drop-outs.
The results of this study show that an increase in student aid has no signiﬁcant eﬀect
on the time-to-degree. But increasing student aid aﬀects the hazard to drop out. With
3The Bologna process changed the degrees obtainable in Germany to the international Bache-
lor/Master system. Prior the main degrees (Diplom/Magister) were not bound to be achieved in a
certain time frame (3-4 years Bachelor, 1-2 years master)
4The term “credit points” oversimpliﬁes the situation, but in general only a certain amount of courses
was needed to complete a degree and the time frame in which these courses could be taken was fairly
lenient.
3more ﬁnancial aid, students tend to drop out less often. This has two main eﬀects. First,
students stay longer in tertiary education, and second, more students eventually graduate.
However, the results also show that the type of funding matters. Ceteris Paribus, about
86 percent of BAfoeG eligible students who are receiving the maximum amount of funding
ﬁnish university by the time they reach the 16th semester, compared to only 45 percent
of students who are receiving the same amount as private transfers.
The paper is structured as follows. After a short theoretical motivation and a brief
overview of the student aid system in Germany in section 2, the empirical analysis is
presented in section 3, where the empirical methodology of the competing risk model is
presented in subsection 3.1. The description of the data set, data selection and variable
deﬁnitions are given in subsection 3.2. In section 4 the results are presented. Section 5
concludes.
2 Theoretical and Institutional Background
In a simple model of a student’s time allocation one might think of a student having three
options to spend time on: he could work to raise money, study to reduce the time until
graduation and thereby increase the return to his education5 and thirdly he could spend
time on leisure. The budget constraint in such a model would be given by labor income,
transfer payments from the family and ﬁnancial aid. In the absence of an eﬃcient student
aid system, credit constraints may appear due to capital market imperfections. Enrolled
students face the problem to cover their living expenses when no chance to borrow money
or to be supported by the family exists. Receiving ﬁnancial aid results in an upward shift
of the budget constraint for students who are eligible for these transfers. In a simple static
labor supply model the predicted eﬀect (for an interior solution) would be an increase in
study time and leisure. If the prediction from this myopic model holds in all time periods
(i.e. students optimize each semester and intertemporal supply concerns are neglected),
5Studies for Germany ﬁnd a positive correlation between the success (grades) and time-to-degree, see
e.g. Schaeper and Minks (1997). An earlier graduation also leads to a longer period of returns given a
ﬁxed retirement age.
4a shorter time-to-degree is expected.
If a student needs to exert a certain ﬁxed amount of eﬀort to satisfactorily ﬁnish a
year, he might not be inclined to study more, even if the budget constraint is relaxed.
This case can be considered a corner solution in the aforementioned model. The result
of allocating student aid to such a student would not be that the student ﬁnishes more
quickly, but rather that only leisure is increased and therefore the time-to-degree is not
aﬀected. However, BAfoeG could also reduce the time-to-degree. Without the oppor-
tunity to smooth consumption the student might be inclined to invest more in studying
to quickly gain access to the higher post-graduation wages. If the necessity to work is
alleviated by giving ﬁnancial aid to the student, it reduces the incentive to start working
as soon as possible. Therefore the time-to-degree might even be prolonged by the receipt
of student aid.
The main source of ﬁnancial student aid in Germany are transfers based on the Fed-
eral Education and Training Assistance Act (“BundesAusbildungsfoerderungsGesetz”,
BAfoeG for short). Introduced in 1971, the basic principle of BAfoeG is to create equal ed-
ucational opportunities for students from low income families by providing governmental
subsidies. The act was amended several times with respect to repayment and entitlement
conditions. But the aim to support students who do not have the means to ﬁnance tertiary
education themselves remained (Blanke, 2000).
In general any student with a university entrance qualiﬁcation under the age of 30
at the beginning of his studies may apply for student aid. But the award of BAfoeG is
means tested. For each applicant the means test involves three steps to check whether
a student qualiﬁes for student aid or not. First, all income sources of the student are
taken into account, i.e. his own wealth and labor income. Second, the ﬁnancial capacity
of the student’s parents is evaluated, wealth, labor income but also the need for possible
expenditures are considered6. In both steps, the act deﬁnes a minimum, the fundamental
allowance (“Freibetrag”), for the amount of wealth and income7 which are excluded in the
6e.g. if the parents have to take care of other children, or other household members
7The Gross income is exempted from a lump sum for social security payments and potentially alimony
payments
5calculations. In the ﬁnal step, a pre-deﬁned amount of basic ﬁnancial need8 (“Bedarfs-
satz”) is compared to the ﬁnancial capacity which is simply the sum of the amounts from
the ﬁrst two steps. If the amount of basic ﬁnancial need exceeds the ﬁnancial capacity a
student has, he is considered to be eligible for transfers according to BAfoeG. The amount
of the transfers are then simply the diﬀerence between the basic ﬁnancial need and the
ﬁnancial capacity.
Being eligible for BAfoeG enables the student to be supported for the standard period
of study which may vary by subject and the type of university (university of applied science
or university), but usually lies between 7 and 9 semesters. The eligibility for transfers
according to BAfoeG, however, are subject to a yearly re-evaluation of the ﬁnancial need
of the student.
The pre-deﬁned amount for the basic need and the fundamental allowance is revised
every second year. Based on the development of real income, productivity and changes in
living-expenses, these amounts should be adjusted to ensure that the living expenses of a
student remain covered. Up to 1997 a steady decrease in the share of students receiving
BAfoeG can be observed (ﬁgure 1(a)). This is mainly due to the insuﬃcient adjustment
of the amount of basic ﬁnancial need and fundamental allowance. In the following years,
the adjustments of the amount of basic ﬁnancial need were still small, but the cut-oﬀ
value of income exemption was increased in 2001 by about 20 percent. This led to an
increase of eligible students and therefore of students receiving BAfoeG. Nevertheless, the
amount of ﬁnancial aid decreased in real terms, which left students with the problem how
to cover their living expenses.
Figure 1(b) shows the diﬀerent income sources for students between the years 1982 and
2006. It can be seen, that the share of parental transfers remain fairly stable over time.
The share of income from student aid however declined over the years from 25 percent
of the students income to only 11 percent in 2000. Contrary to this development, the
share of labor income increased drastically from 19 percent to 30 percent during the same
8The basic ﬁnancial need varies with possible expenditures of the student, i.e. if he lives with his
parents, has health insurance coverage through his parents and which type of school he attends (university
or university of applied science)
6period. As a result of the BAfoeG reform in 2001, the share of income due to BAfoeG
increased slightly in the following years. At the same time a decrease in the share of labor
income is observable.
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(a) Development of amount of basic ﬁnancial
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(b) Sources of monthly income of students be-
tween 1982-2006 (in percent)
Source: Bundesministerium f¨ ur Bildung und Forschung (2007)
These developments are in line with the ﬁndings of Keane and Wolpin (2001). Re-
ducing the amount of student aid, or tightening the eligibility criteria leads to students
working more in order to keep their standard of living.
3 Empirical Methodology
3.1 Model Speciﬁcation
To determine the eﬀect of student aid on the time-to-degree, I will focus on models using
the information on timing in the data. For each period the probability to leave university
in that given period is modeled. The measurement of the time variable plays an important
role in order to apply the right model. While graduating from university is possible at
every point in time, the usual way “time spent at university” is measured, is in half
year terms (semesters). Therefore, I apply a duration model in discrete time and deﬁne a
7period to be a semester. Furthermore I estimate a competing risk model, because students
leave university either by dropping out or by graduating with a degree.
Ti denotes the length of the completed spell, i.e. time-to-degree or dropout, of indi-
vidual i, a discrete non-negative random variable. The variable takes on the value t if the
spell ends in interval (It−1,It] by one of the two exit states. The hazard rate, hij(t), is the
conditional probability of transition from studying to the exit state j in interval t, given
the individual has been studying until the beginning of that interval:
hij(t|αj(t),xi(t),ǫ
m
i ) = Prj(Ti = t|Ti ≥ t,αj(t),xi(t),ǫ
m
i ) (1)
where j = 1 denotes graduating from university, j = 2 dropping out and αj(t) is the
alternative speciﬁc baseline hazard which is common to all individuals. The vector of
covariates for individual i in interval t is denoted by xi(t). In addition to a set of individual
characteristics, xi(t) contains income variables like private transfers, scholarships and the
amount of student aid received. Following Heckman and Singer (1984), I assume a time-
invariant unobserved individual eﬀect, ǫm
i , which is drawn from an arbitrary discrete















i ) = 1; E(ǫ
m
i xi(t)) = 0, ∀m = 1,2,...,M (2)
The mass-points and their probabilities can be interpreted as the respective proportion of
students in the sample belonging to a particular group. The mass-points as well as their
probabilities are estimated simultaneously with the other parameters in the model.
Conditional on the individual-speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity and the vector of ob-
served explanatory variables xi, the latent durations for the two exit states are assumed
to be independent. They can therefore be modeled as competing risks9.
The hazard rate for an exit at time t to any destination j is simply the sum of the
9For an extensive formal discussion of the competing risk model see e.g Prentice et al. (1978), Han
and Hausman (1990) or Abbring and van den Berg (2003)









The unconditional probability to study at the end of interval t, the so called survival
function, can be expressed as the product of probabilities of remaining in a spell in all
previous periods up to period t:
Si(t|αj(t),xi(t),ǫ
m








Hence, the unconditional probability of transition in period t for individual i into exit
state j is given by
Prj(Ti = t|αj(t),xi(t),ǫ
m








for j ∈ {1,2} (5)
In an intrinsically discrete time model, the hazard rate can be formulated as a multino-
mial logit, where in my case the alternatives are “still studying/censored”, “graduation”
and “dropout”. Since the probabilities sum up to one, a convenient normalization is to
use one alternative as reference category. In the following this reference category will be













In the following empirical analysis the baseline hazard is speciﬁed by a set of dummy-
variables. The baseline hazards may vary with the alternatives, e.g time to graduation
takes at least six semester whereas it is more likely to drop out in the ﬁrst few semesters.
To account for this diﬀerence between the alternatives and in order to avoid duration
categories with too few observations I combine semesters for the baseline hazard into
reasonable clusters.















1 individual i makes transition to destination j
0 otherwise
with n being the number of individuals in the sample. Equation (7) is maximized with
respect to the coeﬃcients of the baseline hazard αj, the coeﬃcients of the explanatory
variables βj, and the mass-points together with the corresponding probabilities P(ǫm),
subject to the restrictions on the individual eﬀect given in equation (2), using a standard
numerical optimization procedure10.
3.2 Data and Variables
The empirical analysis is based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)
for the years 1984 to 2007. The SOEP is a yearly household panel which surveys a wide
range of social and economic characteristics (Wagner et al. (2007)). The feature that is of
main interest for this paper, is the retrospective monthly calendar, which allows to identify
whether a person studied during a certain semester11. If a person is observed as having
studied in the months between October and March, he counts as a student in the winter
term (“Wintersemester”). Being a student in the summer term (“Sommersemester”)
implies having studied between April and September. An exception occurs if a student
is observed as starting tertiary education in September, this student will count as having
started in the winter term since many universities oﬀer introductory/preparation classes
before the actual semester starts.
The key variable for the analysis is the amount of student aid received. Like other
income variables in the SOEP, the student aid received is recorded as monthly amount.
Since these variables are surveyed retrospectively the analysis covers the period from the
winter term of 1983/1984 to the summer term of 2006 (which ended in September 2006).
10For the estimation I use Stata-routine gllamm version 2.3.13 written by Rabe-Hesketh et al. (2004)
11There are two semesters each year and each last 6 months. About half of that time is ﬁlled with
lectures.
10To ensure the comparability of students who received and who did not receive ﬁnancial
aid, I restrict the sample to students who are qualiﬁed to apply for student aid. Hence the
sample contains only students who were not older than 30 years at the time of enrollment.
Although non-German nationalities may be supported by student aid, they have to meet
additional requirements which are not modeled in the following. Therefore I restrict the
sample to German students who have studied at least one semester12.
After adjusting the sample, there are 787 individuals left, of whom 240 can be com-
pletely observed from the beginning of their study to the successful completion, 408 are
right censored, i.e. haven’t ﬁnished their studies by the time they are no longer observed,
and 139 are identiﬁable as university dropouts. Since I can observe the students at the
semester level, I have a total of 6,063 observations.
A complication in the data is that the amount of ﬁnancial aid received cannot be
separated into student aid transfers according to BAfoeG and into other ﬁnancial aid, i.e.
scholarships. Therefore I simulate student aid eligibility for each student, which allows
me to distinguish between BAfoeG recipients and students who receive scholarships. The
simulation is based on the respective BAfoeG regulation for each year, where the calcu-
lation of BAfoeG eligibility is based strictly on the wording of the law. If an individual is
eligible for BAfoeG and also received ﬁnancial aid, this observation is treated as “received
BAfoeG”. According to this simulation, 220 individuals were granted at least once in their
student career ﬁnancial aid in the form of BAfoeG.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the main explanatory variables. In the ﬁrst
column the mean and standard deviation for the whole sample are given. The next two
columns distinguish between students who were never and students who were at least
once in their university career supported by BAfoeG. The last two columns distinguish
within the group of student aid recipients between the periods where a student did not
and the periods where the student did receive ﬁnancial aid.
12Until 1991 the sample contains only observations from West-Germany, afterward East-Germans are
considered as well given an individual started studying after 1991
11Table 1: Descriptive statistics of main explanatory variables
BAfoeG recipients
All BAfoeG in periods of
students non-recipients recipients non-receipt receipt
Income per semester in 1,000 Euros1
BAfoeG 0.25 0.00 0.90 0.00 1.30
(0.56) (0.00) (0.73) (0.00) (0.74)
Scholarship 0.13 0.11 0.17 0.47 0.01
(0.34) (0.33) (0.35) (0.67) (0.06)
Private Transfers 0.36 0.39 0.26 0.33 0.23
(0.73) (0.8) (0.53) (0.63) (0.53)
Labor Income 0.13 0.16 0.06 0.12 0.04
(0.35) (0.41) (0.12) (0.23) (0.10)
Sum of all Income 3.26 3.80 2.31 2.91 2.01
(3.94) (4.71) (1.46) (2.64) (1.21)
Month of semester
receiving BAfoeG 0.89 0.00 3.20 0.00 4.92
(1.78) (0.00) (1.98) (0.00) (1.54)
Share of students working 0.59 0.60 0.57 0.55 0.40
Daily Hours during week spend on
Work (conditional on students working) 5.86 5.94 5.66 5.31 5.64
(3.01) (3.11) (2.74) (2.63) (3.2)
Work (unconditional) 1.97 2.15 1.49 1.76 1.43
(2.76) (2.98) (2.02) (2.30) (2.52)
Education 6.73 6.53 7.25 7.53 7.20
(2.43) (2.46) (2.29) (4.95) (2.56)
Individual characteristics
Age at beginning of study 21.56 21.51 21.69
(2.1) (2.05) (2.2)
Married 0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.15) (0.16) (0.12)
Male 0.54 0.54 0.53
(0.5) (0.5) (0.5)
First enrolled at a university 0.68 0.68 0.68
(not a univ. of appl. science) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47)
Parental characteristics
Income in 1,000 Euros1 12.10 14.32 6.39 7.44 6.00
(9.17) (9.44) (5.1) (5.74) (5.01)
Parents are German born 0.79 0.82 0.71
(0.41) (0.38) (0.45)
Parents have at least 0.47 0.53 0.31
a highschool degree (0.5) (0.5) (0.46)
Outcome
Right Censored 0.51 0.53 0.50
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Successfully completed studies 0.31 0.30 0.31
(0.46) (0.46) (0.46)
Dropped out 0.18 0.17 0.20
(0.38) (0.37) (0.40)
Time in semesters
until graduation 11.39 11.51 11.07
(3.56) (3.76) (2.96)
until drop out 8.05 7.76 8.80
(4.9) (4.84) (4.99)
until beeing right censored 6.55 6.09 7.83
(4.43) (4.07) (5.09)
# of students 787 567 220 143 220
Note: data source SOEP 1984-2007, own calculations; Mean values with standard deviation in parentheses.
First column gives the overall mean, second and third the means for BAfoeG recipients and non-recipients, fourth
and ﬁfth column split the recipient’s mean into mean value during time of BAfoeG receipt and non-receipt
(77 students received BAfoeG during all their studies).
Time is measured in semesters where a semester consists of 6 months (April-Sept or Oct - March).
1in prices of 2000.
About 28 percent of the students in the sample received student aid at least once
12during their university career. On average, they received about 1,300 EUR per semester
during the time they were supported. This are 265 EUR per month given that on average
4.9 month per semester student aid was granted. The comparable number reported in
oﬃcial sources yields an average of monthly spending per supported student of about 260
EUR in the year 200613. BAfoeG eligibility depends on ﬁnancial resources of a student.
Students who are eligible for transfers according to BAfoeG, receive with 260 EUR only
a third of the private transfers of non recipients. Also variables describing the parental
background show the expected pattern. Since BAfoeG eligibility is dependent on parental
income it is not surprising that parental income is the lowest for student aid recipients.
While parents of students not eligible for BAfoeG earn about 14,300 EUR per semester,
parents of BAfoeG recipients earn only half of that.
Since the income of the parents during the periods of BAfoeG receipt is only slightly
lower than during the time where the student were not found to be eligible for student aid,
the main reason for loosing the entitlement for BAfoeG seems to be own labor income. The
average labor income increases almost to the level of non BAfoeG recipients. This suggests
either that BAfoeG eligible students have to work more when they are not ﬁnancially
supported, or that students drop out of BAfoeG-eligibility because they earn too much
and therefore exceed the personal fundamental allowance for labor income.
This is also found when looking at the hours worked during the week. While students
who do not receive student aid work about 1.8 hours, students supported by BAfoeG
just work 1.4 hours. This diﬀerence is mainly due to more students working while not
receiving student aid (55 percent compared to 40 percent), rather than a diﬀerence in
hours worked.
Even with student aid, recipients have a lower total amount of ﬁnancial resources
(2,310 EUR) than students who are not eligible for BAfoeG (3,800 EUR). This is a
monthly diﬀerence in income of about 250 EUR.
13Federal Statistical Oﬃce, Fachserie 11 Reihe 7, calculation of ratio of governmental ﬁnancial spending
per month and subsidized students. Comparing the time between 1991-2006 yields a mean diﬀerence of
30 Euros.
Income variables are in 2000 prices.
13Almost two third of the students who are not right censored, have successfully ﬁnished
their studies. This is independent of their source of funding. The same holds for the share
of students that drop out before ﬁnishing. About one third of the students who can be
observed from the beginning to the end of their study fail to complete their degree.
With regard to the other outcome of interest, the time-to-degree, I ﬁnd only a small
diﬀerence between BAfoeG recipients and non-recipients. For both groups the average
lies at 11 semester which is above the normal time of study allotted for a course of study.
These numbers are in line with comparable data compiled by the OECD (2007). There
are however diﬀerences between student aid recipients and non recipients for the average
time until they drop out. While non-recipients drop out on average after 7 semesters,
students who received at least once student aid transfers according to BAfoeG drop out
after 8 semesters.
4 Estimation Results
To estimate the parameters I use a mixed multinomial logit model which allows me to
control for unobserved heterogeneity (see section 3.1). Based on the Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC)14, I ﬁnd that a speciﬁcation with four mass-points (three are estimated
jointly with the parameters, the fourth can be backed out from the results) is best suited
for this speciﬁcation15. All three estimated mass-points, and their probabilities are sig-
niﬁcant, showing that there is unobserved heterogeneity in the data.
Since the model is an extended multinomial logit, the coeﬃcients are hard to interpret
directly. Unlike in the linear model, the marginal eﬀects depend on the values of all covari-
ates. I therefore report in table B1 in the appendix the sample average of the marginal
eﬀects for each individual. The standard errors for the marginal eﬀects are calculated
using the delta method, based on robust standard errors from the mixed multinomial
logit model. A negative (positive) sign for the marginal eﬀect indicates a decrease (in-
14BIC = −(2lnL − kln(n))
15The values of BIC for the speciﬁcation with diﬀerent mass-points can be found in table C3 in the
appendix.
14crease) in the hazard rate which results in a higher (lower) average time-to-degree (or
time-to-dropout).
The baseline hazard for graduating increases with the time spend studying. The
probability to graduate, conditional on survival up to the respective period, increases by
12 percent in semester seven and eight up to 46.6 percent in semester 15 and later relative
to the base category16. The baseline hazard to drop out is similar to the baseline hazard
to graduate as the hazard is fairly low in the ﬁrst 10 semesters (less than 20 percent higher
compared to the base category) and increases sharply thereafter. The pattern exhibited
by the baseline hazard shows, that it is the more likely to make the transition to any
of the exit states the longer a student is studying, whereby the transition to graduate is
more likely in each of the seventh and the following semester.
The control variables aﬀect the transition probabilities beyond the simple baseline
hazards. I ﬁnd that most of the signiﬁcant coeﬃcients translate into signiﬁcant marginal
eﬀects as well. There are however only a few variables with a signiﬁcant impact on the
duration of study.
Turning to the main outcome of interest, I ﬁnd that BAfoeG eligible students have
a signiﬁcantly lower hazard to graduate than non eligible students. That means in each
period their probability to graduate is lower than for students who are not eligible for
student aid. At the same time, BAfoeG eligible students have a higher hazard to drop
out in a given period.
The average marginal eﬀect of the amount of student aid granted is negative for both,
graduation as well as dropout, but signiﬁcant only for the hazard to drop out. In a given
period an increase in BAfoeG by one unit (1,000 EUR) would therefore lead to a decrease
in the conditional probability to drop out by 2.6 percentage points. The BAfoeG increase
attenuates the increasing baseline hazard. Given that the baseline hazard to drop out in
the ﬁrst semesters is roughly 6 percentage points, this increase nearly halves the increase
in the risk to drop out in the ﬁrst six semesters. At the same time, an increase in the
16Values calculated from table B1 in the appendix, i.e. the baseline hazard to graduate in semester 7
is calculated as 0.159 − 0.039 = 0.12
15amount of BAfoeG has no direct eﬀect on the hazard to graduate. While the marginal
eﬀect is not signiﬁcant, the negative sign implies that the hazard to graduate decreases in
the amount of BAfoeG received. Student aid therefore lowers the probability of dropping
out but at the same time prolongs the time-to-degree.
I also ﬁnd negative marginal eﬀects for both the hazard to graduate and to drop out for
the other income measures: private transfers and scholarships. But the type of transfer
received seems to matter. In contrast to the impact of BAfoeG, private transfers and
scholarships signiﬁcantly decrease the conditional probability to graduate, i.e. students
with these types of funding tend to study longer. On the other hand the eﬀect on the
hazard to drop out is weaker than for BAfoeG (and even insigniﬁcant for funding by
scholarships). Qualitatively an increase in funding for BAfoeG receiving students would
therefore lead to a stronger decrease in the drop-out rate with less of an extension to the
average time-to-degree, than increases in other types of funding.
Looking at the other covariates, I ﬁnd that none of the parental background variables
exhibits a signiﬁcant impact, equally so for the individual background characteristics, i.e.
gender, age at the beginning of studies or wether the parents are German born. The
dummy which captures if the student ﬁrst enrolled at a regular university or an university
of applied science has a negative eﬀect on the hazard to graduate as well as on the hazard
to drop out. This captures the usual case that a degree obtained in the same discipline
usually takes longer to complete (even under perfect conditions) at a regular university.
The higher drop out hazard might be explained by stricter requirement about the time
in which a certain amount of courses have to ﬁnished or the number of times exams can
be retaken at universities of applied sciences.
My results indicate that the time spent working has no eﬀect on the average hazard to
graduate or to drop out. The time spent on education however has a positive signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the hazard to graduate. An additional hour each day spend studying increases
the hazard to graduate in a given period by 0.3 percentage points. At the same time,
one more hour spent studying decreases the conditional probability to drop out by 0.2
16percentage points. This ﬁnding suggests that doing some type of paid work while studying
is not detrimental to successfully completing the course of study, as long as the time for
work is not taken away from time spent on education.
To further analyze the channels through which BAfoeG aﬀects the graduation and
dropout rate, I calculate in the following the unconditional probability for both exit
states. In table 2, I report the cumulative transition rates for the sample average as well
as for several funding scenarios based on an average student. The cumulative transition
rate is the probability of a student making a transition from studying to graduation or
dropping out in a given interval (i.e. up to the 4th, 8th, 12th or 16th semester).
Table 2: Cumulative transition rates for diﬀerent funding scenarios
Graduation Dropout
t=4 t=8 t=12 t=16 t=4 t=8 t=12 t=16
Mean:
Base - 0.20 0.50 0.58 0.07 0.14 0.18 0.18
- (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Increase by 600 EUR - 0.20 0.53 0.62 0.05 0.10 0.14 0.14
- (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Increase by 1,200 EUR - 0.19 0.55 0.66 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.11
- (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Scenario 1: Intermediate level parents/no BAfoeG
Base - 0.04 0.47 0.71 0.02 0.08 0.18 0.23
Increase by 600 EUR - 0.03 0.48 0.74 0.01 0.04 0.14 0.20
Increase by 1,200 EUR - 0.02 0.47 0.76 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.17
Scenario 2: Poor parents/Increased BAfoeG/eligibility
Base - 0.06 0.65 0.83 0.01 0.06 0.14 0.16
Increase by 600 EUR - 0.04 0.66 0.86 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.13
Increase by 1,200 EUR - 0.02 0.66 0.88 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.11
Scenario 3: Poor parents/no BAfoeG/work/eligibility
Base - 0.07 0.29 0.36 0.15 0.42 0.56 0.61
Increase by 600 EUR - 0.05 0.32 0.42 0.08 0.29 0.49 0.56
Increase by 1,200 EUR - 0.02 0.37 0.53 0.01 0.07 0.33 0.44
Scenario 4: Rich parents/no BAfoeG
Base - 0.00 0.17 0.45 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.26
Increase by 600 EUR - 0.00 0.16 0.45 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.25
Increase by 1,200 EUR - 0.00 0.16 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.25
Scenario 5: No parental support/maximum BAfoeG
Base - 0.03 0.70 0.86 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.13
Increase by 600 EUR - 0.02 0.69 0.87 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.13
Increase by 1,200 EUR - 0.01 0.69 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.12
Standard Errors in parentheses
Source: Own calculations, based on estimation results in table B1 in the appendix
For the diﬀerent funding scenarios I set all variables, except the income variables,
to their mean in order to produce probabilities for an average student. I consider ﬁve
17scenarios to evaluate the impact of a change in student aid conditional on the diﬀerent
ﬁnancial endowments a student might have. In each scenario there is a base case for
which the probability is reported in table 2 calculated at the values reported in table A2
in the appendix. Starting from the base values, the amount of BAfoeG is successively
increased, ﬁrst by 600 EUR and then by 1,200 EUR per semester (100 Euros per month
and 200 Euros per month). I ﬁx all covariates except for the income variables, which
vary by scenario. One exception occurs in scenario 3. Here I also vary the hours spent
working and studying. The hours worked are ﬁrst set to 5, since labor income is the only
ﬁnancial source these students have. This also reduces the time spent on education (I set
this to 2 hours less than the average per day). With a BAfoeG increase of 600 EUR I
reduce the hours worked by half and increase the hours spent on education by one. For
a BAfoeG increase of 1,200 EUR, the time spent working is set to zero, and the hours
spent on education is set to its mean.
For the average student in the sample (ﬁrst six rows of table 2) the probability to
have graduated by the 16th semester is 58 percent which is a bit smaller than the average
graduation rate from 2000-2006 with 67 percent17. The same holds for the probability to
have dropped out by the 16th semester which diﬀers only slightly from the actual dropout
rate of 21 percent (Heublein et al., 2008). Increasing BAfoeG results in a sizable increase
in the probability to graduate of 4 and 8 percentage points for 600 and 1,200 EUR higher
BAfoeG. At the same time the probability to drop out decreases by 4 and 7 percentage
points.
To get an intuition for the graduation and dropout probabilities of students with
diﬀerent sources of funding, the second to sixth block of table 2 shows the same increase
in BAfoeG as described before, but for ﬁve diﬀerent income situations.
In all of the scenarios, increasing BAfoeG results in an increase in the probability to
graduate, except for scenario 4 where the probability to graduate does not change. In
the other scenarios however, the probability to graduate increase by one to 17 percentage
17own calculation; ratio of graduates to newly enrolled university students with German nationality
for the years 2000 to 2006, see Federal Statistical Oﬃce, Fachserie 11 Reihe 4.3.
18points (an increase of more than 50 percent). At the same time a marked decrease in the
probability to drop out is found for all scenarios.
Diﬀerences arise when comparing an average student with diﬀerent main sources of
funding, i.e. having high parental transfers (scenario 4) versus being funded with the
corresponding amount of BAfoeG (scenario 5). The probability to have graduated by the
16th semester is for an average student who is funded by high parental transfers only
about half the probability when being funded by BAfoeG (45% and 86%, respectively).
The diﬀerences in the graduation rate might be a result of BAfoeG regulations. The
time of being funded by BAfoeG is limited, and additionally half of the BAfoeG amount
received must be repaid. Private transfers on the other hand can be seen as a non repayable
grant which is not restricted to be paid only for a ﬁxed period since it is unlikely that
parents will set a limited time of support in advance.
With intermediate levels of funding, that is in scenario 1 and 2, the initial graduation
rate for a student with an income situation that might arise in low income families, who
receives student aid support (scenario 2) is higher than if such a student is supported
wholly by the parents albeit at an intermediate level (83% and 71%, respectively). For
both groups the main eﬀect of BAfoeG is again a decrease in the probability to drop out
up to the 16th semester.
An average student who works and receives only little parental transfers (scenario 3)
beneﬁts the most. In this scenario an increase of BAfoeG by 1,200 EUR per semester
increases the probability to graduate by 17 percentage points. The probability to drop
out is the highest among all of the scenarios. The introduction of BAfoeG receipt results
in a huge drop in the probability to drop out as it decreases from 61 percent in the base
scenario to 44 percent. However even with this strong decline this group faces the highest
dropout risk.
For the interpretation of my results in light of possible credit constraints, the last case
is of most interest. With an increase in student aid by 1,200 EUR per semester, there are
two main eﬀects: First the probability to graduate increases and second the hazard to
19drop out decreases. The strong eﬀect on the probability to drop out can be interpreted as
a result of credit constraints. A decrease in student aid seems to have only a minor eﬀect
on prolonging the time till graduation caused by the students need to take up work in
order to compensate the ﬁnancial loss. It seems to be from greater importance that these
students are confronted with the need to work full time to cover their living expenses
and therefore drop out of university when their ﬁnancial funding is reduced. This implies
that with more student aid less students drop out, which on the other hand leads to more
students eventually ﬁnishing university. This eﬀect is also found in Ehrenberg and Mavros
(1995) who claim, that the impact on the mean completion rate is much higher than the
eﬀect on the duration.
To check the robustness of my result, I ran regressions with higher polynomials in
income and additionally allowed for time ﬁxed eﬀects. The results of these estimations
can be found in table C2 in the appendix. The time eﬀects are insigniﬁcant in the model
with linear income variables, as well as in the model with non-linear income variables. The
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) suggests that the speciﬁcation with nonlinear income
variables is preferred over the simple linear model, but since the Bayesian information
criteria suggest the linear speciﬁcation, I choose the simpler model.
I estimate my preferred speciﬁcation with diﬀerent mass-points in order to control
for unobserved heterogeneity and to ﬁnd the right number of mass-points. I ﬁnd that
the estimation with 4 mass-points is the best according to both information criteria.
The results can be found in table C3 in the appendix. I also ran a model allowing
the individual eﬀect to vary across exit states implying that the unconditional latent
durations may be correlated. This speciﬁcation, however, did not converge regardless of
the choice of starting values, indicating that there is no correlation in the unconditional
latent durations.
To ensure that my results are robust to right-censoring, I ran my preferred model
again without the right censored observations. The resulting parameter estimates (see
table C1 in the appendix) do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the speciﬁcation including right
20censored observations (see table B1 in the appendix).
Lastly, I considered diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the functional form of the baseline haz-
ard. The results are reported in table C4 in the appendix. Although the information
criteria suggest a diﬀerent speciﬁcation of the baseline hazard, the loss of degrees of
freedom is negligible. I therefore prefer the most ﬂexible functional form using dummy
variables.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I have analyzed the question how student aid aﬀects the outcome of tertiary
education. I have focused on two dimensions, the duration of study and the probability
of actually graduating with a degree. I estimate a duration model which allows me to
analyze jointly the eﬀect of student aid on both the probability to graduate and the time-
to-degree. I focus on student aid provided by the German student aid system (BAfoeG)
which is a need based ﬁnancial support to students from low income families.
Theoretically, the eﬀect of a change in the generosity of student aid on the duration
of study is ambiguous. To answer the direction of the impact empirically I draw on
24 waves from the German Socio-Economic Panel and apply a discrete-time duration
model with two diﬀerent exit states (graduation and dropout), accounting for unobserved
heterogeneity.
My main ﬁndings are that BAfoeG eligible students have per se a lower hazard to
graduate and a higher conditional probability to drop out. The amount of BAfoeG re-
ceived however reduces the drop out hazard on average by 2.6 percentage points per 1,000
EUR BAfoeG per semester. When I investigate this average eﬀect further by comparing
diﬀerent funding scenarios for students, I ﬁnd that an increase in BAfoeG by up to 200
EUR per month would further reduce the risk to drop out by up to one third. With one
exception I ﬁnd only small eﬀects on the hazard to graduate, which suggest that the main
eﬀect is due to a longer duration of studies. The exception is students from low income
families with no student aid support. An average student with poor ﬁnancial endow-
21ments faces the highest dropout risk. With an increase in the amount of BAfoeG there
is a major increase in the probability to graduate. So even if more student aid leads to
a longer duration of study, this result might actually be favorable in policy terms. I also
also ﬁnd that the type of ﬁnancial aid matters. Comparing BAfoeG eligible students who
are funded with the maximum amount of student aid to students who receive the same
amount in private transfers, more student aid recipients graduate by the 16th semester
(86 percent compared to 45 percent).
But the results should be taken with a grain of salt. A potential concern is that BAfoeG
is a very cheap student loan where often only a share of the total funds granted has to be
repaid. I simplify the role of BAfoeG due to the unobservability of the actual debt. The
share of the received BAfoeG amount that needs to be repaid diﬀers depending on the
student’s circumstances. For example a student who is in the top 30 percent of all students
graduating that year, must only repay 25 percent of the BAfoeG if he ﬁnished within the
funding time limit. This might be an incentive for a funded student to concentrate on
his studies and ﬁnish as soon as possible. My results comparing BAfoeG recipients with
students funded only by private transfers, suggests that this might be an incentive for
graduating faster. However controlling for unobserved heterogeneity should alleviate this
problem.
My ﬁndings are comparable to the results found in studies focusing on Ph.D. stu-
dents18, but apply to a much wider range of students. Using data from the German
Socio-Economic Panel allows me to consider funding for undergraduate students, the
majority of enrollees in higher education. While I base my study on data from the Pre-
Bologna era, it helps to shed light on the eﬀect of the introduction of Bachelor degrees
on enrollment. Recent statistics show that the dropout rate is much higher in Bachelor
programs than in the traditional Diploma course of study19. My results suggest that this
can be attributed (at least in part) to the tighter schedule of the Bachelor degrees. Less
time than in the Diploma system can be spend on working in the market and ﬁnancial
18see e.g. Ehrenberg and Mavros (1995) or Siegfried and Stock (2001, 2006)
19see e.g. Heublein et al. (2008)
22constraints become more important accordingly. The role of student aid is therefore even
more important for Bachelor degrees than it was before and should become a focus of
future research as well as policy considerations.
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27A Deﬁnitions
Table A1: Deﬁnition of Variables
Variable Deﬁnition
Income Variables1
BAfoeG: Amount of BAfoeG an individual received
in one semester
Scholarship: Amount of Scholarship an individual
received in one semester
Private transfers received: Amount of private transfers
an individual received in one semester
Labor Income: Amount of labor income an individual
earned in one semester
Parental Income: Amount of labour income of the students parents
earned in one semester
Daily hours during week spent
working: hours an individual has spent working in a job
on education: hours an individual has spent studying
Individual characteristics
Age at beginning of study: Age when student enrolled in tertiary education
Married: Dummy variable indicating if student is married (=1)
First enrolled at a university: Dummy variable that indicates
whether an individual started studying at a
university (=1) or at a university of applied science (=0)
Male: Dummy variable indicating if student is male (=1)
Subject in which degree is obtained Dummy variables indicating in which subject
(e.g. Medicine, Science) degree was obtained
(only available for graduated students)
Parental characteristics
Parents have high-school degree: Dummy variable indicating whether at least
one parent has “Fachhochschulreife” or “Abitur”
Parents are German born: Dummy variable indicating that both
parents are of German nationality
Other
Semester half year term, a semester consists of 6 month
(April-September or October-March)
1in 1,000 EURO and 2000 prices using consumer price index as deﬂator
28Table A2: Base Scenarios
Variable Names Scenario 1: Scenario 2: Scenario 3: Scenario 4: Scenario 5:
Intermediate level parents Poor parents Poor parents Rich parents No parental support
no BAfoeG increase BAfoeG no BAfoeG no BAfoeG maximum BAfoeG
no eligiblitiy eligibility no eligibility no eligiblitiy eligiblity
BafoeG 0 1.8 0 0 3.6
Private Transfers 1.8 0.6 0 .6 3.6 0
Scholarship 0 0 0 0 0
Eligible for BafoeG 0 1 0 0 1
Income variables are in 1,000 EUR
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9B Estimation Results
Table B1: Estimation Results Multinomial Logit
Coeﬃcient Estimates Marginal Eﬀect, sample average
Variable Graduation Dropout Graduation Dropout
Eligible for BAfoeG -0.714† 0.290 -0.024† 0.016∗
(0.407) (0.391) (0.012) (0.008)
BAfoeG -0.668 -1.165∗∗ -0.009 -0.026∗
(0.531) (0.248) (0.016) (0.013)
Private transfers received -1.641∗∗ -1.177∗∗ -0.038∗∗ -0.017†
(0.243) (0.221) (0.012) (0.010)
Scholarship -1.875∗∗ -1.127∗∗ -0.045∗ -0.013
(0.699) (0.350) (0.023) (0.014)
Daily hours during week spend on
Education 0.102∗∗ -0.045 0.003∗ -0.002∗
(0.035) (0.040) (0.001) (0.001)
Work 0.061 0.069† 0.001 0.001
(0.047) (0.042) (0.001) (0.001)
Work x BAfoeG eligible 0.181† 0.080 0.005 0.000
(0.096) (0.066) (0.003) (0.001)
Individual characteristics
Age when started studying -0.018 0.084 -0.001 0.003†
(0.072) (0.075) (0.002) (0.001)
Male 0.205 -0.185 0.008 -0.007
(0.270) (0.339) (0.008) (0.006)
First enrolled at a university -3.126∗∗ -2.338∗∗ -0.081∗∗ -0.042∗
(not a univ. of appl. science) (0.436) (0.396) (0.022) (0.021)
Parental characteristics
Mother has highschool-degree 0.364 0.014 0.011 -0.003
(0.419) (0.392) (0.013) (0.006)
Father has highschool-degree -0.510 -0.367 -0.012 -0.005
(0.339) (0.351) (0.010) (0.005)
Parents are German born -0.316 -0.797∗ -0.001 -0.021
(0.323) (0.345) (0.010) (0.013)
Subject in which degree is intended
(Base: Law, Economics)
n.a. -3.429∗∗ 0.000 -0.108∗∗ 0.042∗∗
(0.417) (.) (0.024) (0.015)
Medicine 0.381 0.000 0.012 -0.004∗
(0.402) (.) (0.013) (0.002)
Social Science,Humanities 1.576∗∗ 0.000 0.053∗∗ -0.015∗∗
(0.421) (.) (0.019) (0.005)
Engineering, Math, Informatics 1.020∗ 0.000 0.033† -0.010∗∗
(0.483) (.) (0.018) (0.003)
Art, Design 4.216∗∗ 0.000 0.168∗∗ -0.033∗∗
(0.787) (.) (0.041) (0.011)
Science 0.273 0.000 0.008 -0.003
(0.590) (.) (0.019) (0.002)
Language, Cultural Studies 1.696∗∗ 0.000 0.058∗ -0.016∗∗
(0.523) (.) (0.023) (0.006)
Baseline Hazard Graduation
(Base: Graduation in semester 1-6)
Graduation in semester 7-8 4.440∗∗ 0.000 0.159∗∗ -0.034∗∗
(0.451) (.) (0.032) (0.012)
Graduation in semester 9-10 6.962∗∗ 0.000 0.286∗∗ -0.048∗∗
(0.670) (.) (0.047) (0.015)
Graduation in semester 11-12 9.171∗∗ 0.000 0.422∗∗ -0.051∗∗
(0.890) (.) (0.055) (0.019)
Graduation in semester 13-14 10.610∗∗ 0.000 0.515∗∗ -0.052∗∗
(0.942) (.) (0.061) (0.015)
Graduation in semester 15 and above 11.146∗∗ 0.000 0.547∗∗ -0.053∗∗
Continued on next page...
30... table B1 continued
Coeﬃcient Estimates Marginal Eﬀect, sample average
Variable Graduation Dropout Graduation Dropout
(1.035) (.) (0.064) (0.015)
Baseline Hazard Dropout
(Base: Dropout in semester 1-2)
Dropout in semester 3-4 0.000 1.798∗∗ -0.021∗∗ 0.063∗∗
(.) (0.323) (0.007) (0.023)
Dropout in semester 5-6 0.000 1.603∗∗ -0.019∗∗ 0.056∗
(.) (0.377) (0.006) (0.023)
Dropout in semester 7-8 0.000 3.166∗∗ -0.039∗ 0.134∗∗
(.) (0.554) (0.018) (0.042)
Dropout in semester 9-10 0.000 4.055∗∗ -0.052∗ 0.193∗∗
(.) (0.900) (0.022) (0.063)
Dropout in semester 11-13 0.000 6.447∗∗ -0.071∗∗ 0.348∗∗
(.) (0.871) (0.018) (0.063)
Dropout in semester 14 and above 0.000 8.450∗∗ -0.083∗∗ 0.513∗∗
(.) (1.054) (0.018) (0.073)
Constant -5.601∗∗ -7.462∗∗
(1.573) (1.880)


















Signiﬁcance levels: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Standard Errors in parentheses
Source: Estimations based on SOEP 1984-2007
31C Sensitivity Analysis
Table C1: Estimation without right-censored observations
Coeﬃcient Estimates Marginal Eﬀect, sample average
Variable Graduation Dropout Graduation Dropout
Eligible for BAfoeG -0.428 0.435 -0.024† 0.029
(0.365) (0.383) (0.014) (0.020)
BAfoeG -1.487∗∗ -1.507∗∗ -0.031† -0.043∗
(0.504) (0.327) (0.018) (0.020)
Private transfers received -1.802∗∗ -1.302∗∗ -0.047∗∗ -0.029†
(0.250) (0.218) (0.015) (0.017)
Scholarship -2.281∗∗ -1.436∗∗ -0.063∗ -0.026
(0.604) (0.376) (0.026) (0.024)
Daily hours during week spend on
Education 0.118∗∗ -0.027 0.005∗ -0.003
(0.044) (0.043) (0.002) (0.002)
Work 0.091 0.081† 0.002 0.002
(0.059) (0.047) (0.002) (0.002)
Work and BAfoeG eligible 0.174 0.097 0.005 0.001
(0.112) (0.070) (0.004) (0.003)
Individual characteristics
Age when started studying -0.012 0.060 -0.002 0.003
(0.081) (0.077) (0.011) (0.004)
Male 0.030 -0.254 0.005 -0.012
(0.322) (0.353) (0.011) (0.017)
First enrolled at a university -2.906∗∗ -2.297∗∗ -0.079∗∗ -0.065∗
(not a univ. of appl. science) (0.465) (0.394) (0.024) (0.029)
Parental characteristics
Mother has highschool-degree 0.439 0.090 0.016 -0.004
(0.363) (0.377) (0.014) (0.017)
Father has highschool-degree -0.508 -0.314 -0.014 -0.006
(0.464) (0.410) (0.014) (0.017)
Parents are German born -0.350 -0.808∗ 0.001 -0.034
(0.409) (0.388) (0.014) (0.022)
Subject in which degree is intended
(Base: Law, Economics)
n.a. -2.750∗∗ 0.000 -0.112∗∗ 0.056∗∗
(0.391) (.) (0.027) (0.017)
Medicine 0.245 0.000 0.010 -0.004
(0.380) (.) (0.014) (0.003)
Social Science,Humanities 1.385∗∗ 0.000 0.057∗∗ -0.023∗∗
(0.395) (.) (0.021) (0.007)
Engineering, Math, Informatics 0.964∗ 0.000 0.039† -0.017∗∗
(0.490) (.) (0.021) (0.004)
Art, Design 3.457 0.000 0.161 -0.049∗
(3.077) (.) (0.151) (0.022)
Science 0.050 0.000 0.002 -0.001
(0.432) (.) (0.016) (0.007)
Language, Cultural Studies 1.344∗ 0.000 0.056∗ -0.023∗∗
(0.561) (.) (0.026) (0.007)
Baseline Hazard Graduation
(Graduation in semester 1-6)
Graduation in semester 7-8 4.530∗∗ 0.000 0.197∗∗ -0.058∗∗
(0.565) (.) (0.039) (0.015)
Graduation in semester 9-10 7.079∗∗ 0.000 0.353∗∗ -0.081∗∗
(0.794) (.) (0.054) (0.027)
Graduation in semester 11-12 9.334∗∗ 0.000 0.492∗∗ -0.085∗∗
(0.988) (.) (0.058) (0.029)
Graduation in semester 13-14 10.860∗∗ 0.000 0.586∗∗ -0.086∗∗
(1.013) (.) (0.061) (0.029)
Graduation in semester 15 and above 11.430∗∗ 0.000 0.617∗∗ -0.087∗∗
(1.114) (.) (0.062) (0.018)
Continued on next page...
32... table C1 continued
Coeﬃcient Estimates Marginal Eﬀect, sample average
Variable Graduation Dropout Graduation Dropout
Baseline Hazard Dropout
(Base: Dropout in semester 1-2)
Dropout in semester 3-4 0.000 1.861∗∗ -0.039∗∗ 0.102∗∗
(.) (0.338) (0.013) (0.034)
Dropout in semester 5-6 0.000 1.584∗∗ -0.032∗∗ 0.087∗∗
(.) (0.383) (0.011) (0.033)
Dropout in semester 7-8 0.000 3.273∗∗ -0.064∗∗ 0.205∗∗
(.) (0.583) (0.025) (0.055)
Dropout in semester 9-10 0.000 4.277∗∗ -0.080∗∗ 0.284∗∗
(.) (0.902) (0.026) (0.071)
Dropout in semester 11-13 0.000 6.816∗∗ -0.096∗∗ 0.461∗∗
(.) (0.888) (0.022) (0.060)
Dropout in semester 14 and above 0.000 8.877∗∗ -0.108∗∗ 0.616∗∗
(.) (1.097) (0.023) (0.062)
Constant -4.809∗∗ -5.643∗∗
(1.730) (1.901)


















Signiﬁcance levels: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Standard Errors in parentheses
Source: Estimations based on SOEP 1984-2007
33Table C2: Diﬀerent speciﬁcations
Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2 Speciﬁcation 3 Speciﬁcation 4
Graduation Dropout Graduation Dropout Graduation Dropout Graduation Dropout
BAfoeG -0.668 -1.165∗∗ -0.750 -1.111∗∗ 0.296 1.936∗ 0.227 1.968∗
(0.531) (0.248) (0.714) (0.269) (1.141) (0.976) (0.905) (0.938)
BAfoeG squared -0.567 -1.668∗∗ -0.609† -1.720∗∗
(0.356) (0.487) (0.339) (0.486)
Private transfers received -1.641∗∗ -1.177∗∗ -1.582∗∗ -1.167∗∗ -0.063 0.546 -0.104 0.407
(0.243) (0.221) (0.279) (0.241) (0.650) (0.665) (0.713) (0.738)
Private transfers received squared -0.803∗ -0.830∗∗ -0.779∗ -0.777∗
(0.343) (0.309) (0.322) (0.309)
Scholarship -1.875∗∗ -1.127∗∗ -2.016∗ -1.177∗∗ -0.989 0.295 -1.075 0.082
(0.699) (0.350) (0.789) (0.396) (1.401) (1.112) (1.636) (1.047)
Scholarship squared -0.700 -0.889 -0.763 -0.814
(1.049) (0.643) (1.371) (0.598)
Base: Started studying between 1992 and 1997
Started studying before 1992 -0.151 -0.455 -0.243 -0.502
(0.346) (0.464) (0.371) (0.489)
Started studying after 1997 0.598 -0.267 0.612† -0.236
(0.446) (0.420) (0.367) (0.395)
Akaike IC 2592.41 2593.44 2578.37 2579.41
Bayesian IC 2941.33 2969.20 2967.55 2995.42
Signiﬁcance levels: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Standard Errors in parentheses
Source: Estimations based on SOEP 1984-2007
3
4Table C3: Preferred speciﬁcations with diﬀerent mass-points
Speciﬁcation 1:
Mlogit 2 MP 3 MP 4 MP
Grad. Drop. Grad. Drop. Grad. Drop. Grad. Drop.
BAfoeG -0.255 -0.624∗∗ -0.646† -0.858∗ -0.897∗ -1.033∗∗ -0.668 -1.165∗∗
(0.183) (0.206) (0.375) (0.358) (0.380) (0.228) (0.531) (0.248)
ε1 1.997∗∗ 3.705∗∗ -2.916∗∗
(0.567) (0.482) (0.448)





P(ε1) 0.423∗∗ 0.270∗∗ 0.429∗∗
(0.101) (0.006) (0.002)





Akaike IC 2688.58 2653.99 2626.72 2592.41
Bayesian IC 2997.23 2976.07 2962.22 2941.33
Speciﬁcation 3:
Mlogit 2 MP 3 MP 4 MP
Grad. Drop. Grad. Drop. Grad. Drop. Grad. Drop.
BAfoeG 0.374 1.454† -0.336 1.436† 0.252 1.672∗ 0.296 1.936∗
(0.632) (0.787) (0.930) (0.821) (0.816) (0.837) (1.141) (0.976)
BAfoeG squared -0.254 -1.146∗ -0.159 -1.312∗∗ -0.451 -1.507∗∗ -0.567 -1.668∗∗
(0.251) (0.487) (0.333) (0.419) (0.288) (0.429) (0.356) (0.487)
ε1 2.677∗∗ -0.808∗∗ 5.535∗∗
(0.553) (0.224) (0.580)





P(ε1) 0.333∗∗ 0.675∗∗ 0.220∗∗
(0.007) (0.002) (0.001)





Akaike IC 2671.54 2632.81 2601.65 2578.37
Bayesian IC 3020.46 2995.15 2977.40 2967.55
Signiﬁcance levels: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
italic numbers are calculated values
Standard Errors in parentheses
Source: Estimations based on SOEP 1984-2007
1Estimation with 5 masspoints is not feasible for both of the speciﬁcations
35Table C4: Estimation with diﬀerent functional baseline hazards
Time speciﬁed as
Dummy Variables Logarithmic Function linear Trend linear and squared Trend
Graduation Dropout Graduation Dropout Graduation Dropout Graduation Dropout
BAfoeG -0.668 -1.165∗∗ -0.849∗ -1.228∗∗ -0.840∗ -1.149∗∗ -0.768 -1.132∗∗
(0.531) (0.248) (0.410) (0.237) (0.353) (0.235) (0.750) (0.320)
Graduation in semester 7-8 4.440∗∗ 0.000
(0.451) (.)
Graduation in semester 9-10 6.962∗∗ 0.000
(0.670) (.)
Graduation in semester 11-12 9.171∗∗ 0.000
(0.890) (.)
Graduation in semester 13-14 10.610∗∗ 0.000
(0.942) (.)
Graduation in semester 15 and above 11.146∗∗ 0.000
(1.035) (.)
Dropout in semester 3-4 0.000 1.798∗∗
(.) (0.323)
Dropout in semester 5-6 0.000 1.603∗∗
(.) (0.377)
Dropout in semester 7-8 0.000 3.166∗∗
(.) (0.554)
Dropout in semester 9-10 0.000 4.055∗∗
(.) (0.900)
Dropout in semester 11-13 0.000 6.447∗∗
(.) (0.871)




t 0.751∗∗ 0.416∗∗ 1.955∗∗ 0.522∗∗
(0.064) (0.071) (0.251) (0.174)
t squared -0.050∗∗ -0.002
(0.009) (0.006)
Akaike IC 2592.409 2601.802 2632.059 2571.929
Bayesian IC 2941.327 2890.330 2920.587 2873.877
Signiﬁcance levels: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Standard Errors in parentheses
Source: Estimations based on SOEP 1984-2007
3
6